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The merits of Britain’s trade policy in the late nineteenth century have 
been long debated. Williamson and O’Rourke found a positive 
correlation between tariffs and growth across countries in the period, 
suggesting that free trade harmed the British economy. By contrast, 
Crafts and Broadberry disagree with the idea that the late Victorian 
slowdown in British productivity can be ascribed to weak exports, and 
instead highlight the benefits of openness to Britain’s services sector. 
This dissertation will aim to contribute to this debate by examining a 
little studied example of British soft protectionism. In 1887, Britain 
sought to protect manufacturers from competition in home and foreign 
markets by passing the Merchandise Marks Act. This required that a 
large share of imports had to be marked with an indication of their 
country of origin. It was hoped the Act would protect the reputation of 
British products, curtail unfair foreign trade practices, and encourage 
consumers to buy British products. While the Act was not a tariff, it 
generated controversies that echo those today over geographical 
indicators (GIs) and can be seen as an early form of non-tariff barrier.  
 
The second part of the dissertation addresses whether the Act affected 
British trade. I do not find evidence the Act was able to halt the advance 
of German manufacturing exports to Britain. But there is strong 
evidence that it damaged Britain’s entrepot trade and enhanced trade 
between commercial rivals and colonial markets. This supports 
Broadberry and Craft’s assertion that economic openness benefitted the 




Should Britain have persisted with free trade in the late nineteenth century as 
commercial rivals adopted protectionism? The question has sparked debate from 
the period in question to the present. This dissertation examines a little studied 
example of British soft protectionism, the 1887 Merchandise Marks Act, to shed 
light on the issue. I argue that there is no evidence the Act stemmed foreign import 
penetration. The Act did hurt Britain’s entrepot trade, resulting in damage to the 
mercantile and shipping industries. This supports the view that openness was 




There is an extensive literature about the forces that shaped British trade policy 
in the late nineteenth century. One debate has focused on why Britain persisted 
with free trade while other countries adopted protectionism to varying degrees. 
Standard trade theory suggests that although there are aggregate welfare gains 
from free trade, there are also distributional consequences. In Williamson’s 
influential view, the adoption of protectionist policies in the late nineteenth 
century was determined by the political bargaining power of winners and losers 
from free trade. Consistent with a Heckscher-Ohlin model, globalising forces 
caused convergence in factor prices, hurting landed interests, and helping labour, 
in European countries with high land rent/wage ratios and vice versa in the New 
World. Britain’s rural sector was smaller than that of France’s or Germany’s, 
however, meaning that agricultural interests that suffered from a New World 
‘grain invasion’ were politically marginalised relative to exporters and urban 
workers that benefitted from free trade.1  
 
Building on this economic framework, other historians have emphasised the 
importance of political institutions in determining the outcome of the British 
debate over free trade. Eichengreen has suggested the failure of the fair trade 
movement was due to a lack of political cooperation between disparate 
protectionist interests as well as the extension of the franchise in 1867 and 1884 
that diluted the power of landowners relative to the working classes.2 In a similar 
way, Irwin argued that British maintenance of free trade after the Liberal victory 
at the 1906 election was due to a greater voice for the working class and 
manufacturing interests who benefitted from free trade. According to him, the 
franchise reduced the organizational costs of involvement in the debate, allowing 
voters to overcome collective action problems that typically faced advocates for free 
trade.3  
 
1 Williamson, J. G. “Globalisation, Labour Markets and Policy Backlash in the Past,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Volume 12, Number 4, (Autumn, 1998), p.66 
2 Eichengreen, B. “The Eternal Fiscal Question: Free Trade and Protection in Britain, 1860-
1929,” University of California Working Paper No.91-171, (July 1991), p.11 
3 Irwin, D. “The Political Economy of Free Trade: Voting in the British General Election of 1906,” 
The Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 37, Number 1, (April 1994)  
3 
 
More recent work has stressed some of the limitations of the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model in explaining both the development of British trade and political 
motivations. O’Rourke argues that static trade theory is ambiguous about whether 
a country with a monopoly in industrial products, such as late nineteenth century 
Britain, will benefit from free trade. As it turned out, O’Rourke points out, Britain 
felt competition in manufacturing from protectionist rivals more acutely than in 
agriculture.4 Others have shown that models of monopolistic competition are more 
applicable to late Victorian trade than models based on comparative advantage. 
For example, John Brown shows how the German cotton industry was able to 
make major inroads into Britain’s market share despite relatively high labour 
costs and no obvious technological advantage, highlighting the importance of 
better German marketing and commercial awareness.5 If manufacturing interests 
were threatened by free trade this, in turn, would undermine the idea that the 
strength of protectionism in late nineteenth century Britain can be boiled down to 
the factor prices of land and labour. 
 
A second, related, debate has focused on the merits of free trade for the British 
economy. At a cross country level, O’Rourke found a positive correlation between 
tariffs and growth in the late nineteenth century. He identifies a higher savings 
rate as a result of the increase in the prices of final goods relative to capital goods, 
the protection of infant industry and the encouragement of a shift from agriculture 
into industry as possible explanations for a positive effect of protectionism on 
growth.6 Could Britain’s retention of free trade therefore have hurt its growth? 
While there is debate as to exactly when British productivity fell behind industrial 
rivals such as Germany, it is clear that by the early 20th century Britain’s 
competitive advantage in manufacturing had been substantially eroded.7 In the 
steel industry, Webb argues that German productivity gains owed to a combined 
 
4 O’Rourke, K. “British trade policy in the 19th century: a review article,” European Journal of 
Political Economy, Volume 16, (2000), p.835 
5 Brown, J. C. “Imperfect Competition and Anglo-German Trade Rivalry: Markets for Cotton 
Textiles before 1914, The Journal of Economic History, Volume 55, Number 3, (September 1995) 
6 O’Rourke, K. “Tariffs and Growth in the Late 19th Century,” The Economic Journal, Volume 
110, Issue 463, (April 2000) 
7 Ritschl. A. “The Anglo-German Industrial Productivity Puzzle, 1895-1935: A Restatement and 
Possible Resolution,” The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 68, No. 2, (June 2008) 
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cartel-tariff system that encouraged vertical integration and reduced the risk of 
capital investments.8 Feinstein argued that the closing of US and European 
markets through tariffs more than offset the beneficial impact of higher foreign 
incomes for British exports, although concluded there was little Britain could do 
about tariffs.9 More recently, Varian finds that US bilateral tariffs were a 
significant determinant of trade costs between Britain and the United States 
during the period.10 By contrast, Broadberry and Crafts disagree with the idea 
that economic openness held back the British economy. They suggest that ongoing 
British openness had a positive impact on productivity as resources shifted out of 
low productivity agriculture while Britain’s high productivity services sector, 
represented by industries such as finance and transport, benefitted.11 In a recent 
article, Crafts revisited McCloskey’s famous 1970 article on whether the Late 
Victorian economy failed, concluding that trade competition from Germany played 
only a small part in Britain’s productivity ‘climacteric.’12 
 
A third and related debate is the importance of trade policies in international 
trade. Research on the effects of trade policy has seen renewed interest over the 
last few years in the context of both the UK’s exit from the European Union and 
the 2018-19 US trade war with China. This comes after a period in which their 
study had become somewhat marginalised in economic literature. According to 
Goldberg and Pavcnik, this marginalisation was due to increasing academic focus 
on broader measures of trade costs such as transport and distance as well as 
measurement issues. The authors note the inherent difficulty in measuring non-
tariff barriers, which became relatively more important as tariffs became less 
 
8 Webb. S. “Tariffs, Cartels, Technology, and Growth in the German Steel Industry, 1879-1914,” 
The Journal of Economic History, Volume 40, Number 2, (June 1980) 
9Feinstein, C., ‘British exports and economic growth (1850-1914)’, in International trade and 
British economic growth from the eighteenth century to the present day, eds. P. Mathias and J. A. 
Davis, (Oxford, 1996) 
10 Varian, B. “The Course and Character of Late Victorian Exports,” LSE e-thesis, (London 2017), 
last accessed 17th July 2021, weblink, pp.51-80 
11 Crafts, N. and Broadberry, C. “Openness, protectionism and Britain’s productivity performance 
over the long-run” CAGE Online Working Paper Series, Number 36, (2010)  
12 Crafts, N. “British Relative Economic Decline in the Aftermath of German Unification,” 
Warwick Economics Research Papers Series, No.1295, (July 2020), McCloskey, D. “Did Victorian 
Britain Fail?” The Economic History Review, Volume 23, Number 3, (December 1970) 
5 
 
prevalent in the late 20th century.13 In the field of economic history, an example of 
this renewed interest is provided by Bromhead et al, who assess the impact of 
British protectionism on inter-war trade volumes using disaggregated import 
data. While the authors conclude that global demand was the primary cause of 
falling trade volumes, protectionist policies explain a considerable degree of the 
reshaping of geographical trading relationships in the inter-war period.14  
 
In the context of these debates, there has been surprisingly little recent attention 
paid to the 1887 Merchandise Marks Act (often referred to henceforth as the Act), 
a piece of British legislation that generated major controversy during the 1880s 
and 1890s. The Act for the first time compelled foreign manufacturers to place 
indications of geographical origin on their exports to Britain and gave customs 
authorities the power to seize goods bearing misleading indications of origin. 
While two historians have characterised it as one of the ‘few accomplishments’ of 
the fair trade movement during the period,15 there have been no detailed academic 
assessments of the legislation since Hoffman’s 1933 book, “Great Britain and the 
German Trade Rivalry, 1875-1914,” in which it was given prominent place.16 
Hoffman saw the Act as a form of protectionism in response to German trade 
competition but argues, in line with some nineteenth century views, that it 
backfired by opening the eyes of both domestic and colonial consumers to the 
quality of German manufactures.17 The omission of the Act from the literature on 
British trade policy is all the more striking as it was passed in the year of peak 
agitation for a reform of Britain’s free trade policy in the late nineteenth century.18 
 
13 Goldberg, P. and Pavcnik, N. “The Effects of Trade Policy,” NBER Working Paper 21957, 
(February 2016) 
14 De Bromhead, A., Fernihough, A., Lampe, M., O’Rourke, K. “When Britain Turned Inward: The 
Impact of Interwar British Protection,” American Economic Review, Volume 109, No. 2, 
(February 2019) 
15 For a non-academic study, see Stusowski, D. “A Manufacturing War Between the UK and 
Germany in the 19th Century Set the Stage For Today’s Trade Crisis,” History Collection, June 5th 
2017, last accessed 28th June 2021, weblink. The two historians are Neuburger, H. and Stokes, 
H., “The Anglo German Trade Rivalry, 1887 – 1913: A Counterfactual Outcome and Its 
Implications,” Social Science History, Volume 3, Number 2, (Winter, 1979) p.188. 
16 Hoffman, R. Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry, 1875-1914 (Routledge, New York, 
2021), p.45-50  
17 Ibid, p.45-50 
18 Zebel, S. “Fair Trade: An English Reaction to the Breakdown of the Cobden Treaty System,” 
The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 12, No. 2, (June 1940), p.117 
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Complaints about the Act became particularly acute during the 1890s and were 
most famously articulated by Ernest Edwin Williams’s ‘Made in Germany,’ a 
polemical tract in support of fair trade. The book highlighted how German 
manufactures had gained market share at the expense of Britain in both foreign 
and domestic markets due to the free advertising provided by the legislation, as 
German exporters adorned products with the ‘Made in Germany’ sign. This is 
brought to life vividly by Williams’s description of the increasing prevalence of 
German trademarks in British domestic life:  
 
“Roam the house over, and the fateful mark will greet you at every turn, 
from the piano in your drawing-room to the mug on your kitchen 
dresser…’”19 
 
The Merchandise Marks Act also generated controversy abroad. Hoffman 
highlights how the German Chancellor Gustav Stresemann looked back at it as 
representing the starting point of deteriorating political relations between Britain 
and Germany in the run-up to World War One.20 British newspapers of the time 
frequently reported German complaints about the unfair slandering of their trade 
practices in commercial journals, and after the Act came into force, German and 
Austrian manufacturers complained about the discriminatory nature of the 
legislation on their exports.21  
 
Recent academic literature on the 1887 Merchandise Marks Act has been 
associated primarily with business history and the development of trademarks, 
brands, and intellectual property rights, rather than trade policy. Higgins has 
discussed the Act in the context of the development of trademarks and intellectual 
property law.22 Lopez Silva similarly explores the changing ways in which British 
 
19 Williams, EE., Made in Germany, Heinemann (London, 1896), p.10 
20 Hoffman, R. Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry, 1875-1914 (Routledge, New York, 
2021), p.274 
21 The Times, October 3rd, 1887, p.3 The Economist, February 25th, 1888, p.254 The Economist, 
July 6th, 1889, p.869 
22 Higgins, D. “Firms and Indications of Geographical Origin in the First Global Economy,” in 
Brands, Geographical Origin and the Global Economy, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge, 
2018) and Higgins, D. and Tweedale, G. “Asset or Liability? Trade Marks in the Sheffield Cutlery 
and Tool Trades,” Business History, Volume 37, Number 3, (1995) 
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companies sought to protect their brands from foreign imitations in the late 
nineteenth century, of which litigation using legislation like the Merchandise 
Marks Act was one.23  
 
The relative lack of attention to the Act when it comes to debates over British free 
trade is likely because it does not fit neatly into the literature on late nineteenth 
century policy measures. As I show below, it was partly motivated by concerns 
about German encroachment into British manufacturing, but it was not a tariff 
and might best be described as a non-tariff barrier. Other forms of British soft 
protectionism have recently been obtaining more scholarly attention, however. 
The term soft protectionism is used in this dissertation to mean non-traditional 
forms of trade distorting measures rather than tariffs or quotas. These non-
traditional forms can include non-tariff barriers, domestic subsidies, or regulatory 
measures.24 For example, Higgins has treated the 1926 Merchandise Marks Act, 
which succeeded the 1887 Act by tightening up requirements on the compulsory 
marking of foreign goods, as a form of soft protectionism and notes that the Balfour 
Committee acknowledged it as such.25 Relatedly, as the 1926 Act was designed in 
part to facilitate imperial preference, Varian and Higgins discuss how from 1926-
33 the Empire Marketing Board tried, unsuccessfully, to appeal to consumers’ 
patriotic instincts to increase British purchases of Commonwealth goods.26 Lopez 
da Silva has also investigated the importance of the 1875 Trade Mark Registration 
Act as a reason for British dominance in consumer goods exports in the late 
nineteenth century.27 This dissertation will seek to add to this burgeoning 
 
23 Silva Lopes, T. and Casson, M. “Brand Protection and the Globalisation of British Business,” 
The Business History Review, Vol. 86, No. 2, (2012)  
24 Thrasher, R. and Gallagher, K “Defending Development Sovereignty: The Case For Industrial 
Policy and Financial Regulation in the Trading Regime,” in Rethinking Development Strategies 
after the Financial Crisis, Volume 1: Making the Case for Policy Space, eds. Calcagno, A., Dullien, 
S., Márquez-Velázquez, A., Maystre, N., Priewe, J., UNCTAD (New York, 2015) pp.93-105 
25 Higgins, D. “Unfair Competition and the Merchandise Marks Act, 1926,” in Brands, 
Geographical Origin and the Global Economy, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge, 2018), 
p. 125 
26 Varian, B. and Higgins, D. “Money Talks – Give Yours an Empire Accent: The Economic 
Failure of Britain’s Empire Marketing Board, 1926-33,” Paper Presented at Economic History 
Society’s 2019 Conference 
27 Da Silva Lopez, T., Guimaraes, P. “Trademarks and British dominance in consumer goods, 
1876-1914,” The Economic History Review, Volume 67, Number 3, (August 2014) 
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literature by examining the 1887 Merchandise Marks Act in the context of the 




This dissertation will seek to answer two distinct, but related, questions.  
First, was the Merchandise Marks Act of 1887 a form of British soft protectionism?  
Second, what was its effect on British trade? 
 
 
Methodology and Sources 
This dissertation will use both qualitative and quantitative sources. To answer 
whether the Act can be seen as a form of soft protectionism, I will first describe 
the historical background to, and workings of it. I will then set out how 
geographical indications of origin are treated by economic theory, focusing on the 
debate between those that see them as a form of protectionism, and those that see 
them as improving consumer information and market efficiency. Using this 
framework, I will then situate the Act using contemporary sources, specifically: 
The Parliamentary Select Committee reports of 1887 and 1890 that were 
established to design, and then assess the working of the legislation respectively, 
the Report of the Royal Commission on Trade and Industry (1886), contemporary 
newspaper reports from the Economist, Times, Financial Times, Daily Telegraph, 
Sheffield and Rotherham Independent, parliamentary debates, booklets from the 
Cobden Club and Conservative and Unionist Party and the Royal Society of Arts.  
To answer the second question, a quantitative approach is necessary. I first 
examine British imports by product category at a monthly frequency between 
1885-1890, which I digitized from The Economist’s Monthly Trade Supplement 
collecting 576 observations.  I use a simple univariate time series model to test for 
a short-term disruption on British imports.  
 
I then assess the longer run impact of the Act on British trade. To examine the 
impact on British imports, I digitize annual British imports from major trading 
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partners at an aggregate and commodity level in the decade preceding and 
following the Act, collecting 1,549 observations. I use a panel model to assess the 
impact on imports from countries that were particularly affected by the Act – 
Germany and Belgium – after controlling for prices and other factors that 
influence trade.  
 
Finally, I assess the claims of merchants and shippers that the Act had a negative 
impact on Britain’s entrepot trade – shipping of non-British goods to third markets 
– and encouraged direct trading links between foreign nations and Britain’s 
colonies. To do so, I focus on Indian trade. I digitize annual data on Indian imports 
by commodity and country in the years surrounding the Act from the Annual 
Statement of the Trade and Navigation of British India with Foreign Countries 
collecting 1,683 observations. Using a similar panel model, I explore whether the 
introduction of the Merchandise Marks Act had an impact on Indian imports, after 
controlling for prices and other variables.  
 
 
Background to and Design of the Merchandise Marks Act 1887 
Background to the Act 
Calls to protect British manufacturers from foreign firms fraudulently marking 
goods date back to the 1850s.28 Early on, Germans were seen as the main culprits. 
In an influential paper presented to the Royal Society of Arts, the academic Leone 
Levi highlighted that German companies profited by using British marks to sell 
inferior goods at a higher price, producing ‘loss of reputation and loss of trade to 
the British manufacturer.’29 Complaints about the fraudulent marking of non-
British as British goods cropped up in subsequent years. For example, a Select 
Committee chaired by the Liberal MP Sir Henry Jackson in 1879 heard evidence 
of foreign made watches being sold as British through the use of British hallmarks. 
The Select Committee recommended tightening the legislation around 
 
28 Bently, L. “The making of modern trade mark law: the construction of the legal concept of 
trade mark (1860-1880),” in Trade Marks and Brands, An Interdisciplinary Critique, eds. Bently, 
L., Davis, J., Ginsburg, J. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, March 2011), p.5 
29 Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, March 18th1859, p.266 
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trademarks.30 But it was not until the 1880s that impetus for legislation to protect 
British manufacturers from unfair foreign trade practices gathered steam. 
 
The impetus was provided by two main developments. The first was a slump in 
British export growth that had begun in the mid-1870s and would go on to be 
described as part of late Victorian Britain’s ‘productivity climacteric.’31 By 1885, 
the perceived decline in British trade had become sufficiently acute for the 
Salisbury government to establish the Royal Commission on the Depression in 
Trade and Industry. In its report, released in 1886, the practice of German goods 
masquerading as British ones was seen as so detrimental that it was highlighted 
as one of the subsidiary causes of the depression, particularly affecting the 
hardware industries of Sheffield and Birmingham. It was the only cause of the 
depression identified in the Report that was coupled with a recommendation for 
legislation. The Report suggested a strengthening of existing laws on trademark 
protection and that the United Kingdom enter into negotiations with foreign 
countries to obtain similar protection for British manufactures abroad.32  
 
The second development was an international effort to establish common ground 
for intellectual property rights and trademarks. British trademark law began to 
be formulated in earnest from the 1860s onwards, starting with the 1862 
Merchandise Marks Act and culminating in the 1875 Trade Mark Registration 
Act.33 Growth in international trade in the second half of the nineteenth century 
made brands increasingly valuable as industry developed strategies to overcome 
information asymmetries across a more globalised marketplace.34 In tandem, this 
 
30 Special Report from the Select Committee on Merchandise Marks Act (1862) Amendment Bill, 
Henry Hansard, June 1887, p.10 
31 Arthur Lewis lays the blame for Britain’s productivity climacteric primarily at the fall in 
foreign trade, arguing that it diminished investment and thus productivity and was a consistent 
feature of the British economy from 1873-1913. Lewis, A. “The Deceleration of British Growth, 
1873-1913,” Development Research Project, Woodrow Wilson School, November 1967, p.53  
32 Final Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Enquire Into the Depression of Trade and 
Industry, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, (1896) p. xxv 
33 Bently, L. “The making of modern trade mark law: the construction of the legal concept of 
trade mark (1860-1880),” in Trade Marks and Brands, An Interdisciplinary Critique, ed. Bently, 
L., Davis, J., Ginsburg, J. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, March 2011) 
34 Higgins, D. “Firms and Indications of Geographical Origin in the First Global Economy,” in 
Brands, Geographical Origin and the Global Economy, 2018 (Cambridge, 2018), p.32 
11 
 
period saw an increasing proliferation of misleading trademarks. Pressure to do 
something to discourage false advertising resulted in the 1883 Paris Convention 
of the Industrial Property Union, with eleven signatories including Great Britain. 
This was followed by its revision in Rome in 1886. Much of the agreement was 
focused on the protection of patents and intellectual property, but clauses nine and 
ten of the Convention concerned the fraudulent marking of goods. These 
established the right of the signatories to seize goods at the border that advertised 
misleading information, where this was associated with the false representation 
of a trademark.35 
 
In Great Britain, the 1883 Convention was not enforced by any new legislation 
concerning the false advertising of goods. In fact, it was perceived that the 
Convention did not go far enough when it came to preventing false marking. 
Shipments could only be seized where it could be established that they infringed 
an established trademark. The driving force behind tougher legislation was the 
Sheffield Cutlers Company, who represented the Sheffield steel and cutlery 
industry and had complained for years about inferior German made products 
misleadingly marked as having been made in Sheffield.36 In 1883, a complaint 
made to the Board of Trade by the Company generated wider public awareness: 
the cause was taken up by the Daily Telegraph, and further controversy was 
generated by the Sheffield Independent alleging in February 1886 that 
unscrupulous merchants frequently passed off substandard German cutlery as of 
Sheffield make.37 In February 1887, deputies from the Cutlers Company 
petitioned the Board of Trade for legislation and were joined by Liberal MP for the 
Sheffield constituency of Brightside, A. J. Mundella.38 The previous year, the 
Cutlers had accompanied a British delegation to Rome in 1886 to push for an 
amendment to the Paris Convention to make any false indication of origin an 
 
35 Special Report from the Select Committee on Merchandise Marks Act (1862) Amendment Bill, 
Henry Hansard, June 1887, p.1 
36 Higgins, D. “Trade Marks and the Defence of ‘Sheffield,’ in Mesters to Masters, A History of the 
Company of Cutlers in Hallamshire, eds. Binfield, C., and Hey, D., Oxford University Press, 
(Oxford, 1997), p.88 
37 “The Treason of Sheffield Traders,” Sheffield and Rotherham Independent, February 13th, 
1886, p.6 
38 Daily Telegraph, February 14th, 1887, p.3 
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offence, although this was not ratified by the delegates. Finally, in spring 1887 a 
Select Committee met to examine legislation drafted by the Board of Trade. The 
Cutler’s company had played a major role in advising the Board of Trade on the 
drafting of the legislation.39 In July, the legislation was passed. 
 
The Design and Implementation of the Act 
The key clause of the 1887 Act was to make the application of a false trade 
description to goods, or the sale of falsely described goods, punishable through a 
substantial fine or up to two years hard labour. The Act also allowed British 
customs authorities to seize goods bearing a misleading trade description, or 
suspected of bearing such a description, at the border. False trade description 
included measures of quantity, weight, manner of manufacture, material and ‘as 
to the place or country in which any goods were made or produced.’40   
 
How the Act would be implemented was outlined by British customs authorities 
in late 1887. Its application was far reaching. A trade description was any ‘direct 
or indirect,’ description of the goods.41 Where any ambiguity concerning the place 
of manufacture existed, the customs authority would seize goods ‘unless there be 
added to the trade description…the name of the place or country in which the 
goods were actually made or produced.’42 The Act therefore went beyond the 
confiscation of goods intended to deliberately defraud the consumer. It provided 
customs authorities a wide latitude when it came to stamping out any form of 
advertising that could be construed as misleading. 
 
Customs interpreted this to mean that goods imported from a non-English 
speaking country that contained a description bearing English language words, 
and that was not accompanied by an obvious indication as to where the product 
 
39 Special Report from the Select Committee on Merchandise Marks Act (1862) Amendment Bill, 
Henry Hansard, June 1887 p.3 
40 Merchandise Marks Law Consolidation and Amendment Bill 1887, Clause 3. According to the 
evidence heard by the 1887 Select Committee, the 1862 Merchandise Marks Act did include a 
clause making it an offence to apply a misleading trade description when it came to the origin of 
goods, but this clause was ‘inoperative.’ 
41 The Economist, The Economist Monthly Trade Supplement 10th December 1887, p.7 
42 Ibid, p.8 
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had been manufactured, could be seized. For example, interrogating the Deputy 
Chairman of the Board of Customs on how the Act was enforced, MPs heard that 
goods marked with a simple trade description such as ‘Superfine black silk, 36 
yards,’ would be stopped unless it was accompanied by a clarifying description of 
where the good was made.43 Because of this, as the Deputy Chairman of the Board 
of Customs made clear when giving evidence to the 1890 Select Committee 
investigating the working of the Act, the majority of goods detained by customs in 
1888 and 1889 were not fraudulently marked, they had been stopped merely ‘on 
account of trade descriptions in the English language.’44  
 
Unmarked Imports and the Act in the British Colonies 
An important feature of the Act, which distinguished it from its successor, the 
1926 Merchandise Marks Act, was that goods could be passed through customs 
unimpeded if they were imported unmarked, that is to say, with no description at 
all on the goods. The issue of unmarked imports cropped up frequently in evidence 
before the 1890 Select Committee tasked with reviewing the working of the Act.  
Several manufacturers complained that while the 1887 Act had reduced the 
import of goods into Britain with misleading marks, unscrupulous merchants 
continued to import unmarked foreign goods before adding misleading 
descriptions or trademarks after they had passed through customs.45 The 
Conservative MP Howard Vincent, a member of the Select Committee and one of 
the most prominent supporters of the Fair Trade League (established in the early 
1880s to campaign for a repeal of free trade), tabled an amendment to the Act to 
mandate that all foreign imports, marked or unmarked, should be stamped with 
the words ‘made abroad,’ but this amendment was rejected by the majority of the 
Committee. The Act’s successor legislation in 1926 moved someway in this 
direction by enforcing the compulsory marking of any foreign imports subject to 
an Order in Council by the Board of Trade. An application for an Order in Council 
 
43 Report from the Select Committee on Merchandise Marks Act, 1887, Henry Hansard, July 1890, 
p. 7 
44 Report from the Select Committee on Merchandise Marks Act, 1887, Henry Hansard, July 1890, 
p. 1 
45 Report from the Select Committee on Merchandise Marks Act, 1887, Henry Hansard, July 1890, 
pp. 13, 58, 69, 74  
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could be made by manufacturers affected by a particular category of foreign 
import. 
 
After the Act was passed in the United Kingdom, the Board of Trade requested 
that the Foreign Office prevail upon colonial governments to pass similar 
legislation. The importance of this was paramount, as it was perceived that the 
issue of false marking was as, if not more, pernicious in colonial markets than in 
British ones. While fraudulent descriptions might be detected by English 
consumers, colonial purchasers might prove more credulous.46 It was thus hoped 
that imports of low-quality foreign products into Britain’s colonies would be 
checked. Most complied. By mid-1888, Gibraltar, the Gold Coast and the Straights 
Settlements had all passed similar legislation.47 India implemented its own 
Merchandise Marks Act in April 1889. By 1890, the only colonies not to pass 




The Merchandise Marks Act as a Geographic Indication 
Geographical Indications of Origin and Economic Theory 
While the 1887 Merchandise Marks Act owed in part to concern about German 
encroachment on British manufactures, it was not a tariff, and it is not 
immediately clear whether it qualifies as a protectionist measure. The Act was an 
early form of geographic indication (GI) protection, whose development in the late 
nineteenth century Higgins has described as owing to the increased quantity of 
trade and awareness of brand importance.49 In recent decades, GIs have become a 
hotly debated feature of international trade negotiations after their adoption in 
the 1992 WTO TRIPS agreement.50 
 
46 The Times, August 16th, 1887, p.7 
47 The Economist, The Economist Monthly Trade Supplement, June 16th, 1888, p.10 
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The theoretical literature on geographical indications and trade economics is still 
at a relatively early stage. Some studies have argued that geographical indications 
are relevant for consumer decision making and thus can have significant impacts 
on trade. For example, Chiang and Masson outline a theoretical model in which 
consumers practice discrimination against countries with less well-established 
brand names.51 This is suboptimal for countries with less developed brands, such 
as in the developing world, as they must overcome the free rider problem 
associated with upgrading product quality and improving brand reputation across 
multiple firms. Raustialer and Munzer argue that GIs represent a form of 
monopoly rights. They discuss various legal arguments that have been proposed 
for GIs, including firstness, the moral right of the community to a place name, 
innovation incentives arising from the protection of intellectual property and 
preventing confusion for consumers. They conclude that the only valid argument 
in favour of GIs is to prevent confusion for consumers. Other justifications, 
including that of stimulating innovation incentives through the protection of 
intellectual property, are less justified because, unlike patents, GIs do not expire 
and, unlike registered trademarks whose advantage accrues to a single firm, they 
provide rents for other producers that free ride off the back of established GIs.52 
In a similar fashion, Haucap et al argue that GIs act primarily as a signalling 
device to consumers for product quality. Addressing the ‘Made in Germany’ 
geographical indication that was spawned by the 1887 Merchandise Marks Act, 
they argue that higher start-up costs in more advanced industrial markets confer 
advantages to products in the eyes of consumers. These advantages can be 
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Links Between Debates on the Merchandise Marks Act and Contemporary 
Debates on GIs 
Several links can be drawn between contemporary debates over GIs and the 1887 
Merchandise Marks Act. A first is disagreement between countries over their 
adoption. The value of a country’s established brand reputation is an important 
factor when it comes to whether or not it widely adopts GIs.54 Today, the largest 
proponent of GIs is the EU which has registered the most geographical indications, 
and which interprets the TRIPS legislation most strictly. In contrast, the United 
States, and several developing economies, see certain GIs as unfair and have 
accused the EU of protectionism.55 In the late nineteenth century, the nearest 
equivalent of the EU when it came to GIs was Britain, whose dominant global 
position in manufacturing and more established brands led it to be a strong 
proponent. France was also a firm advocate of GIs having been an early innovator 
when it came to brand protection, particularly in the wine industry.56 By contrast, 
Germany declined to sign the 1883 Paris Convention, nor its revision in Rome in 
1886, only eventually joining the convention in 1903.57 The United States similarly 
did not initially sign up to the Convention. In evidence at the 1890 Select 
Committee on the Act, MPs heard how Belgium had absented itself from the 
Madrid Convention on the international registration of trademarks in order to 
retain freedom for retailers to advertise as they wished, and because they 
perceived it would have a detrimental impact on trade.58 New entrants to global 
markets such as Germany, the United States and Belgium had less well-
established brand names and therefore less interest in GIs. They might be seen as 
analogous to developing countries today in their opposition to GIs. 
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A second analogy is the link drawn by proponents of GIs between a specific place 
of production and the quality of goods they produce. EU arguments in favour of 
GIs revolve around the idea that quality can be tied to a particular location, 
embodied in the French term terroir. While today’s debate about geographical 
indications mainly concerns protection of agricultural products, such as ‘Iberico 
ham,’ or ‘Chianti wine,’ the 1887 and 1890 Select Committee Reports are full of 
links drawn by witnesses between the quality of British manufactures and their 
place of origin, either due to superior British workmanship, higher quality of raw 
materials or innate British knowhow. One such example was watches, where the 
English hallmark had become a kind of ‘national trademark.’59 In the case of 
cutlery, one manufacturer declared ‘the acknowledged superiority of the British 
article.’60 One of the objectives of the Act was to prevent inferior goods being sold 
‘with a good name,’ thus protecting the reputation of Sheffield steel, Birmingham 
watches or Worcester porcelain.61 The Economist elucidated the importance of the 
reputation of British manufactures in an article discussing the Merchandise 
Marks Act in 1890. Noting how the Act had prevented foreign competitors from 
gaining a price advantage from passing off continental goods as English ones, the 
newspaper cautioned British industry against lowering the quality of their 
manufactures: 
 
“All the world over cheapness is more attractive to the producer than 
durability or high finish. Should British manufacturers then be 
encouraged to lower the quality of their productions in order to compete 
with their rivals? Advice of this kind has frequently been offered in late 
years, but those are short-sighted counsellors that would be content to 
see the high reputation of English goods sacrificed in order that the 
volume of our trade be enlarged.”62 
 
Insofar as GIs can demonstrate product quality, as is suggested by the literature, 
their adoption by Britain can thus be seen as an attempt to protect its high quality 
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reputation in certain products in the face of increasing price competition from 
abroad. This would resonate with research that suggests that product quality 
matters when it comes to trade. Baldwin and Harrigan have argued that high 
quality products are better suited to overcoming both distance and trade costs.63 
Similarly, it has been widely documented that economic openness tends to 
encourage quality innovation.64 From a historical perspective, British concerns to 
protect the ‘good name’ of their manufactures during the late Victorian period can 
therefore be seen both as a product of the increasing integration of world markets 
over that period, and as an adaptive response to the protectionist measures 
adopted by other commercial rivals from the 1880s onwards. These measures 
affected relative prices, retaliation for which Britain had chosen to abrogate due 
to its support for free trade. What Britain could protect was the quality of 
reputation of its products. Reputation was all the more important as British 
exports tended to remain competitive over the period against mass production 
techniques employed by commercial rivals in industries which utilised a skilled 
workforce and in which Britain had a strong brand.65 
 
A third analogy between the 1887 Merchandise Marks Act and contemporary 
disputes over GIs were debates over what exactly could be protected. A 
particularly thorny issue was generic names. Genericide, or the process through 
which a product ceases to be associated with its place of manufacture, has become 
a controversial topic in negotiations over GIs.66 1862 legislation over false marking 
provided an exemption for generic names, such as Kidderminster Carpets, Utrecht 
velvet and Stilton cheese. Nevertheless, the definition of generic names continued 
to prove difficult to pin down. For example, there was an extensive debate over the 
use of the term Balbriggan hosiery used by British manufacturers. They argued, 
unlike Sheffield steel, that consumers did not associate the product with its 
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namesake in Ireland because it had been known thus for a long time.67 In 1890, 
the debate was still ongoing, for example over whether ‘sherry’ should be 




Search Costs or Rent Seeking? Political Context, Manufacturers, 
Merchants and Shippers 
While these analogies are instructive in situating the Act within the contemporary 
literature over geographic origins and trade, there is still the question as to 
whether it represented protectionism. As I have discussed above, economic theory 
is somewhat ambiguous in its treatment of GIs. The primary justification provided 
for GIs has been that they reduce consumer search costs and improve market 
efficiency, while the primary criticism has been that they provide unfair rents to 
producers in countries that use GIs.  
 
The political context and intention behind the passing of the Merchandise Marks 
Act is therefore important, as are the attitudes of contemporaries about the 
purpose of the legislation. In this section, I show that while the Act was seen by 
some of its advocates merely as a means to prevent fraud, it also coincided with 
the peak of agitation for tariff reform in the second half of the nineteenth century 
and was regarded by others as a tool to protect British manufacturers. I also show 
that, like today, there was a robust debate between economic actors that saw the 
legislation as a way of enhancing consumer information and those that saw the 
Act as an impediment to trade. Most notable in the latter case were merchants 
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The Merchandise Marks Act was passed the same year in which protectionist 
sentiment reached its peak in Victorian Britain, with organisations such as the 
Fair Trade League gaining in membership and public voice.69 With the formation 
of the Salisbury Government in coalition with Liberal Unionists in 1886, 
Conservative MPs supportive of fiscal reform had become a key swing constituency 
in Parliament. There was also increasing pressure on the Conservative Party 
leadership to support tariff reform from the grassroots of the party, most notably 
after resolutions in favour of fair trade were passed at party conventions in 
Scotland, Birmingham, and Oxford in 1887.70 
 
Was the passing of the Act by the Salisbury government linked to rising support 
for tariff reform? On the one hand, the Act counted free traders such as the Liberal 
MP Mundella among its primary advocates. Mundella, unsurprisingly, did not 
characterise it as an attempt to protect British manufactures from foreign 
competition, although he represented the Sheffield constituency most affected by 
misleading indications.71 Other voices that supported free trade characterised the 
legislation as an attempt to protect manufacturers from ‘unfair’ foreign 
competition. As the pro free trade Economist noted in November 1887, “With the 
main object of the Act, it scarcely necessary to say we entirely sympathise. It is 
directed against fraud, and fraud, in every shape, must be abhorrent to every 
honest man.”72  
 
Rather than a unilateral act of trade retaliation, it was noted how the Act could 
potentially protect foreign manufacturers as well as British ones from fraudulent 
marking of their goods, that is assuming their countries signed up to the 1883 
Convention on Industrial Property and enacted similar legislation. Herbert 
Hughes, a solicitor representing the Sheffield Cutlers, argued that the legislation 
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‘would not only deal with sins against ourselves but will deal with our sins against 
other people.’ ‘73   
 
The Merchandise Marks Act also did not elicit substantial opposition in 
Parliament, although one Liberal MP felt that the protection of the place names 
from which manufactured goods originated was treading on ‘risky ground’ given 
the potential for endless litigation.74 One Irish MP tabled an amendment to protect 
Irish industries from the malpractices of British manufacturers. Otherwise, the 
legislation passed without major controversy.75  
 
Some MPs that were advocates of, or sympathetic to, the fair trade movement saw 
the Act as a means to address foreign competition in trade, however. Howard 
Vincent, among the most influential of all MPs supporting fair trade at the time, 
was a member of the 1890 Select Committee investigating the effectiveness of the 
legislation and was of the view that the Act was mainly directed to the ‘protection 
of English trade rather than foreign.’76 Vincent’s view was that the legislation 
should be tightened to compulsorily mark all foreign goods. When the Master 
Cutler of Sheffield agreed with his amendment while giving evidence to the Select 
Committee, Vincent asked whether it would not have the effect of: ‘giving a great 
development and impetus to our manufacturing industry?’77 The pro-free trade 
Chairman Baron Henry de Worms asked however whether such a measure would 
exclude foreign goods from the country unfairly and ‘diminish the trade of the 
country generally?’.78  
 
In some respects, therefore, wider debates over the merits of free and fair trade 
were played over the Act. In 1886, a pamphlet appeared from the pro-free trade 
Cobden Club attacking the Royal Commission into the Depression of Trade and 
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Industry’s minority report that Britain should retaliate against foreign tariffs. The 
Cobden Club made no mention of the majority report’s recommendation for a 
tightening of legislation on the false marking of goods.79 By 1897, however, the 
Cobden Club had changed their tune, describing ‘that unfortunate Merchandise 
Marks Act, which undoubtedly was intended, from a Protectionist point of view, to 
put some impediment in the way of foreign merchandise and to secure some 
Measure of Protection for the English manufacturers.’80 By contrast, ahead of the 
1892 General Election, the Conservative Party issued a booklet for candidates 
highlighting the Act as one of the important achievements of the Salisbury 
Ministry. The booklet noted approvingly: “In the first year of operation (1888-9), 
22,286 parcels of goods were detained at the ports.” This had ‘generally been most 
beneficial for the manufacturing interests of the country.’81  
 
Unfair Foreign Trade Practices and Consumer Protection: Manufacturers 
The views of economic actors are also important when it comes to assessing the 
intentions of the legislation. Their voices can be heard in the evidence provided to 
the 1887 and 1890 Select Committees. Several manufacturers argued that the 
legislation was designed primarily to protect consumers, rather than themselves. 
One manufacturer argued: ‘We do not want protection in any form whatever. We 
only want the public to know really what they are buying, and today they do not.’82  
 
When challenged about the principle of caveat emptor, it was argued by 
manufacturers that consumers were in many cases unable to distinguish between 
foreign and domestic made goods, unless they had the requisite expertise. In one 
instance, a watchmaker highlighted that MPs on the Committee had been sold 
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German made watches marked as English to the displeasure of the affected 
members.83  
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that many manufacturers had a vested interest in its 
application. Courtney Boyle, Assistant Secretary to the Board of Trade and the 
main architect of the legislation, was of the view the Act served a dual purpose. 
To prevent purchasers from being deceived, “And also to prevent the tradesman 
who has a good name…having things fraudulently sold under that description.”84 
The Sheffield Cutler’s Company was a primary instigator of the legislation, and 
Sheffield had been most affected by the phenomenon of false marking, but the 
1887 Select Committee also heard from a variety of manufacturing interests, 
among them representatives of the watch trade, cotton trade, hosiery trade, cigar 
manufacturing trade, iron trade and amber trade, all of whom were supportive of 
the legislation.85 Those most enthusiastic for an extension of the legislation to 
require compulsory marking of all goods were usually those for whom geographical 
indications were most valuable. For example, one witness declared that it would 
be ‘a very great advantage’ to the Worcester porcelain industry to have all foreign 
goods marked and they should have no objection to adding the name ‘Worcester 
porcelain’ to their products should foreign governments similarly require the 
compulsory marking of British goods.86    
 
Some manufacturers also clearly saw the legislation as a form of retaliation for 
foreign protectionism. For example, the Chairman of the Hemp and Tow Spinners 
Association believed an additional strengthening of the law – to mark all foreign 
imported products - was justified on the basis that ‘we pay very heavy tariffs.’87 
The ‘small masters’ of the Sheffield trade similarly felt the Act was just retaliation 
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for the fact that they paid high duties on their exports. They complained about the 
preponderance of foreign merchants ‘who were so interested in foreign trade that 
they will encourage foreign productions before they encourage English 
productions.’88 John Holden, a cloth merchant from Lancashire representing 200 
firms, complained that Indian firms had copied his firm’s designs and were 
producing cheap rip-offs. Noting that profits in the Lancashire cloth industry were 
cratering, Holden highlighted the practices of American manufacturers dumping 
cheap cloth on the British markets. ‘The effect of that will be that the genuine 
goods and the genuine trade, and the manufacture of this country is spoilt for the 
time being.’ But if it were to be known the cloth was American (by being marked) 
‘they could be cleared out without injuring to the same extent the English 
manufacturers.’89 
 
The Act was also geographically discriminatory. As I have discussed above, 
German competition played a driving force in motivating the legislation. Germany 
is mentioned 107 times in the 1887 Select Committee Report on the Merchandise 
Marks Act, as compared to 54 times for France, the next most mentioned country, 
and 31 times for the United States. Customs authorities’ interpretation of the law 
also singled out non English speaking countries. Customs would stop goods 
containing descriptions, in English, from non-English speaking countries. 
However, customs did not stop goods containing English descriptions from English 
speaking countries, as it was difficult to argue that these descriptions could 
represent a misleading indication of their origin. Assistant Secretary to the Board 
of Trade Boyle noted how this advantaged goods from the United States and 
English colonies over those of other foreign countries.90  
 
Opposition to the Merchandise Marks Act: Merchants 
While the Merchandise Marks Act did not arouse significant opposition in 
Parliament, and was embraced by manufacturers, it was far from universally 
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welcomed. Merchants felt that it was designed to protect manufacturing interests 
and neglected their own. Merchants were under-represented when MPs 
considered the legislation at the 1887 Select Committee, but one of the few 
witnesses called from the mercantile community, Louis Blumfeld, a merchant of 
pipes and fancy goods, believed that the bill would be “a very serious thing,” for 
his trade by preventing the merchant from styling the goods in the way requested 
by the customer.91 The Secretary of the London Chambers of Commerce wrote a 
letter to the Committee expressing the view that the legislation would be onerous 
on tobacco brokers and merchants.92 Similarly, in a letter written to The 
Economist in April 1887, one tobacco merchant highlighted the ‘extreme severity 
with which the Government Merchandise Marks Act Amendment Bill will press 
upon commission merchants and brokers.”93  
 
The 1890 Select Committee, hearing evidence two years after the Act was put into 
operation, heard many complaints from merchants. Kenric Murray, Chairman of 
the London Chambers of Commerce put it thus when asked if the Act had been 
successful: “I divide my answer into two parts. It had been favourable for 
manufacturers but less favourable for merchants…I think the great majority of 
mercantile associations…did not quite realise the full bearing of the intention of 
the new legislation [when it was first implemented].’94 
 
Complaints about the Act took several forms. One was that it prevented merchants 
from shipping goods with the descriptions desired by the purchaser. This was a 
departure from previous practice, as retail vendors were accustomed to asking 
merchants to provide goods with their own names stamped upon the product.’95 
Another was that it was customary to the merchants to put their own name on the 
goods as consumers were more familiar with brand associated with the merchant’s 
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name than the manufacturer.96 By contrast, manufacturers complained about 
merchants who refused to purchase goods that had been marked by 
manufacturers, particularly those with less well established brand names.97  
 
Merchants also felt that the Act gave away trade secrets. Murray argued that: “If 
a merchant goes to great expense in sending out travellers and opening out branch 
houses in different parts of the world, we consider he has a right to the relative 
secrecy of the results which he obtains by that expenditure.”98 John Pollock, 
Chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce in Paris, agreed, arguing that 
goods bearing of a mark of origin: “Gives up a trade secret, and a merchant should 
not be obliged to tell his customer where his goods come from.”99 Another 
argument raised by merchants was that the Act would backfire and provide 
foreign firms with free advertising. John Kay, representing a major Glaswegian 
textile importer, described the operation of the Act in 1890:  
 
“Of course the German manufacturer likes [the Act] very much. He has 
taken advantage of this Act so far that, whenever possible, he puts his 
name on. If he is allowed, he puts his town on, but we confine him as 
much as possible.”100  
 
Merchants were generally dubious about any improvement in consumer 
information arising from the Act. In the words of Murray: ‘I do not think the 
purchaser cares one iota what the nationality of goods is.’101 He argued that 
purchases were based simply on price and quality. Pollock complained that the 
law was interfering with the free transit of goods at the ports. “It is the most 
stringent law with regard to merchandise in any country at the present 
moment.”102 He argued that: ‘the French opinion is, that we are coming to 
protection,’ and moreover that the Act would backfire by inciting other countries 
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to pass similar legislation against Britain. Indeed, Pollock argued, any further 
strengthening of the Act could elicit a tariff response from the French.103 
 
Further Opposition to the Act: The Shipping Industry 
The Act also attracted strong opposition from the shipping industry. Complaints 
were heard about disruption at the ports. Disruption had been caused by customs 
procedures to check that goods were not falsely marked and detain them if the 
marks were considered misleading. Crucially, these checks applied on goods that 
were destined for sale in the British market, and on those for transhipment to 
foreign or colonial markets. This had resulted in the loss of Britain’s entrepot 
trade, or so the shipping industry claimed. Foreign manufacturers, they 
complained, had instead established direct links with other markets in order to 
avoid having their goods checked by British customs.  
 
Miles Fenton, General Manager of the South Eastern Railways, complained that 
the Act had made the process of customs checks over goods in transit for onward 
locations such as New York much more strenuous. This in turn had discouraged 
foreign transit trade: ‘the examination has become so altered, and made so strict, 
that it is actually driving the traffic away…and now it is finding its way to foreign 
ports.’104 He cited several instances of British customs adopting a strict 
interpretation of the law and detaining goods with any English language writing 
on them.105 Fenton believed that unless the Act was modified, the shipping trade 
would materially diminish, as foreign merchants dared not risk their goods 
passing through British customs and being detained.  
 
Charles Henry Wilson MP, a steam ship owner, echoed these sentiments. Since 
the Act had come into force, traffic from continental ports: ‘has been seriously 
interfered with by foreign goods, sent to British ports for transhipment, having 
been seized, delayed and subjected to heavy expenses; and in some cases they have 
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been damaged and their market value reduced.’106 Wilson argued the practical 
effect of the Act was to have resulted in a ‘double injury to British trade.’ This was 
because foreign merchants that sold falsely marked goods to foreign markets now 
simply sent them directly. As foreign governments had not passed similar 
legislation, this provided no benefit for English manufacturers, but had damaged 
the carrying trade. Wilson argued that goods destined for transhipment should 
not be stopped by British customs. Asked whether this could see British shippers 
facilitating the sale of falsely marked goods, Wilson said: ‘it is one of those 
difficulties you cannot get over, and if you try to stop them here, you do not the 
least good because they go direct.’107 
 
Edmund Taylor, a representing the Liverpool Steamship Owners Association 
similarly objected to the Act’s provisions on transhipment, providing a prosaic, if 
illuminating, example about the frictions that had been caused to the 
transhipment trade: 
“…it is a case with reference to gloves, and the label there was 
“Neptune.” These goods were made in Belgium and they were stopped at 
Folkstone. They were intended for a sailing on the 29th of August and we 
could only get them away on the 19th of September. The result of that 
one stoppage is that we have lost the whole traffic of that one 
consignee.”108  
 
Richard Cattarns, General Manager of the General Steam Navigation Company, 
who represented the short sea steamers between the continent and Britain, noted 
how half of the shipping trade was made up of goods in transit. He said:  
 
“…our transit trade has been more or less destroyed by the operation of 
the Act, and a still further fact has developed itself in that the course of 
trade has turned around, as it were, and that we are now taking goods 
to the continental ports for transhipment there in the ocean steamers, 
in place of our bringing goods from the Continent for transhipment here 
into British bottoms.”109 
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Like the other witnesses, he argued that the provisions of the Act should not apply 
to goods in bond (those destined for transhipment): 
 
“…it is not only the shipping trade that is being injured by this process, 
but the trade of the country at large…Formerly, London had the great 
advantage, because you could always secure a lading in London, largely 
owing to the enormous quantities of this transhipment traffic. Now that 
lading has been destroyed, and the inducement for that ocean ship to 
come to London destroyed with it, with the result that charters are now 
made on equally favourable terms to the port of Hamburg.”110 
 
Agricultural Interests 
Landed interests were hardly represented when it came to debates over the Act. 
Although one Select Committee member, Charles Wing Gray, a farmer and MP 
for the rural constituency of Maldon, enquired as to the effect of the Act on 
fraudulently marked bundles of foodstuffs in 1890, agricultural products were not 
mentioned at all in the 1887 Select Committee.111 From 1890 onwards, concerns 
about the false marking of agricultural products did become more prominent, 
resulting in legislation that allowed prosecutions under the Merchandise Marks 
Act by the Board of Agriculture.112 However, in the context of the debate over the 
motivations of protectionist sentiment in Britain during the late nineteenth 
century, it is striking that when it came to the main piece of legislation concerning 
false marking, landed interests played almost no role. 
 
Search Costs or Rent Seeking? 
Ultimately, we are unlikely to resolve the debate as to whether the Merchandise 
Marks Act was a form of soft protectionism. The Act meant different things to 
different people and, much like the debate over GIs today, was seen on the one 
hand as legislation that remedied unfair trade practices and improved consumer 
decision making, and on the other as an unjustified impediment to free trade. Even 
within groups that supported the legislation, such as manufacturers, opinion was 
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June 2010, (the bill was in 1896) 
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not uniform. While some manufacturers saw it as protection from foreign 
competition, others claimed they only wanted a level playing field.  
 
What is clear is that the Act was formulated at least in part as an attempt to 
protect manufacturers against foreign competition. Moreover, witnesses called 
from the mercantile and shipping community were opposed to the legislation and 
saw it as an unnecessary and damaging interference to trade. When it comes to 
the political economy of the debate, it is striking that the Act was passed at the 
zenith of the fair trade movement’s influence in the late nineteenth century. That 
the Act was able to secure broad based support in parliament was likely because 
its focus on curtailing ‘unfair’ foreign competition made it less ideologically suspect 
than tariffs. By contrast, the main opponents of the Act, at least until the middle 
of the 1890s, stemmed from a relatively narrow set of economic interests. Indeed, 
the trade-off made between the manufacturing and mercantile and shipping 
community was explicitly acknowledged in the 1890 Committee Report:  
 
‘One of the most important points into which your Committee had to 
enquire was that raised by witnesses on behalf of the shipping industry 
who contended that that industry was being seriously damaged by the 
inconvenience caused to shippers by the examination of goods in transit.’  
 
But Committee could not recommend exempting goods in transit from the Act 
because:  
‘…such abolition would facilitate the importation…of large quantities of 
goods bearing false indications of origin or otherwise falsely marked, to 
the great detriment of British manufacturers or workmen.’113 
 
 
The Impact of the Merchandise Marks Act on British Trade: Qualitative 
Evidence 
Contemporary Views About the Effect of the Merchandise Marks Act on Trade 
What was the impact of the Merchandise Marks Act on British trade? Before 
addressing empirical evidence, it is worth outlining contemporary views. While 
 




initially supportive, a large section of opinion grew quickly concerned that the Act 
had backfired. There is little doubt that contemporaries saw the Act as being an 
important piece of trade legislation. The Economist reported in February 1888 that 
“Although the Parliamentary Session of 1887 was not prolific of new legislation, 
several measures of considerable importance, from the business point of view, 
were passed. Of these, the chief was the Merchandise Marks Act, the effect of 
which, stated in a few words, is, that goods must not be sold under false 
pretences.”114 In August 1887, The Times editorial reported “There are, indeed, 
few branches of trade into which this Bill, if rigidly enforced, will not introduce a 
sort of revolution.”115 
 
Official attitudes towards the Act were that it had been successful in its objectives. 
The summary of the 1890 Select Committee reported that: ‘the Merchandise 
Marks Act of 1887, has generally been most beneficial to the manufacturing 
interest of the country, and the importation of fraudulently marked goods…has 
materially diminished.’116  
 
Nevertheless, it was acknowledged that the Act had caused frictions at the border 
at an early stage. Austrian and French merchants had complained about the Act 
according to The Economist, which also noted in February 1888 that the Act 
‘continues to give a good deal of unpleasant emotion to our exporters,’ on account 
of the treatment of transhipped imports.117 The same paper, in December 1888, 
noted continued ‘grumbling’ from the mercantile community about its 
implementation.118 This led the customs to reissue their guidance on the 
treatment of imports under the legislation. By 1890, major complaints were being 
voiced in the press from the shipping industry. The Economist reported: 
 
 
114 The Economist, Commercial History and Review of 1887, February 18th, 1888, p.3 
115 The Times, August 16th, 1887, p.7 
116 Report from the Select Committee on Merchandise Marks Act, 1887, Henry Hansard, July 
1890, iii 
117 The Economist, February 11th, 1888, p.184 
118 The Economist, December 1st, 1888, p.1506 
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“Loud complaints are made by the English shipping agents established 
in Paris over the injury done to their business by the Merchandise Marks 
Act in England. A great part of the carrying trade between France and 
the United States is carried on by the English lines of steamers, freight 
being collected by their agents here and forwarded to London or 
Liverpool for trans-shipment. Although such merchandise only enters 
English ports in transit, the Customs officers examine it as if intended 
for sale in England, and detain it if found bearing marks or labels in the 
English language, as often required by the American importer.”119  
 
Complaints from shippers gave way to the idea that the Act had aided foreign 
competition by providing ‘free advertising’ for German products. In August 1890, 
The Economist reported the words of the British Consul General in Berlin thus: 
 
“The experience of the past year has demonstrated that the Merchandise 
Marks Act, 1887, far from damaging German export industry, 
has…called the attention of foreign buyers to its capability. It appears 
that goods bearing the description ‘made in Germany’ are frequently 
demanded, and direct relations of German merchants with foreign 
purchasers have been increased.”120  
 
The most famous articulation of the backfiring of the Merchandise Marks Act was 
Ernest Edwin Williams’s influential polemic ‘Made in Germany.’ Williams, a 
journalist connected to the Fabian Society, was commissioned by the publisher 
William Heinemann to investigate the causes of Britain’s weak industrial 
performance in the mid-1890s. Williams’s book, published in 1896, primarily 
attributed the causes of Britain’s industrial strife to foreign tariffs, subsidies for 
the transport industry and superior technical education. Nevertheless, he also 
argued Act had damaged English manufactures: “The best argument against it is 
that it operates as a free advertisement for German manufactures.”121 Williams 
also neatly encapsulated the political economy behind debates over the Act: 
 
‘The conflicting opinions raging around its merits will be found to resolve 
themselves finally into a case of Manufacturer v Trader. Sheffield sees 
in the Act a protection against German cutlers: London, a blow at her 
trading interests. London gets rich on sale commissions on German 
manufactures, and she likes not the introduction of direct trading, which 
 
119 The Economist, May 31st, 1890, p.696 
120 The Economist, August 16th, 1890, p.1052 
121 Williams, EE. Made in Germany, Heinemann (London, 1896), p.138 
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– as she claims – is fostered by the Act…when London urges that, 
indirectly, English manufacture as well as English trade is hit by the 
Act, she essays a more formidable argument. But London has no data 
wherewith to support her contention.’122 
 
Concerns about the effect of the Act were not limited to polemics. In the same year 
of the book’s publication, the perceived damage to British shipping, with Hamburg 
seen as having overtaken Liverpool as a shipping destination, led to calls in 
Parliament for a public enquiry.123 In 1897, industrial commissioners enquiring 
into the progress of technical education in Germany reported that the 
Merchandise Marks Act ‘is generally spoken of as a strong weapon against 
England,’ due to providing advertising for the goods of foreign rivals.124 Courtney 
Boyle, one of the architects of the Act, was meanwhile defending the working of 
the legislation. In a speech in Wakefield, he addressed the accusation that it had 
seen the English market flooded with German goods, highlighting that in the nine 
months to September 1895 imports from Germany had decreased while exports 
had increased. He also argued that Act had done good by calling attention to the 
significant numbers of goods produced by other nations.125 
 
Boyle’s arguments may look naïve. But as Williams noted, protestations by the 
mercantile and shipping industry that the Act was damaging British trade fell on 
deaf ears because they were unable to marshal the quantitative evidence 




The Impact of the Merchandise Marks Act on British Trade: 
Quantitative Evidence 
As discussed above, contemporaries highlighted three impacts of the Merchandise 
Marks Act on British trade. First, advocates of the legislation argued the Act had 
 
122 Ibid, p.139 
123 Financial Times, August 7th, 1896, p.5 
124 Financial Times, January 20th, 1897, p.2 
125 The Times, January 22nd, 1896, p.7 
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reduced the amount of falsely marked goods entering Britain. Second, after time 
it was perceived that the Act may have encouraged British, and foreign and 
colonial, imports of German products due to the free advertising provided to goods. 
Third, opponents from the mercantile and shipping industries argued that the 
Merchandise Marks Act had negatively impacted Britain’s transhipment trade 
and encouraged direct trade between foreign countries and British colonies. This 
section will examine each of these claims. 
 
The Impact of the Act on Falsely Marked Goods 
The first is difficult to verify. To do so, data on the amount of falsely marked goods 
entering the United Kingdom would be needed and this was not collected by 
British customs. The main evidence cited in favour of the diminishment in imports 
of falsely marked goods is that the number of detentions of goods went down over 
time. For example, the number of goods detained under the Act fell from 5,677 in 
the financial year 1888-89 to 3,403 in 1890-91. After this point, detentions of goods 
levelled off.126 These data on detentions are not strong evidence of the Act’s 
effectiveness, however. First, the same data suggests that seizures of goods fell 
less than detentions over the time period.127 Second, manufacturers complained 
that foreign exporters had circumvented the legislation by exporting unmarked 
imports which were not checked under the Act.128 It is therefore possible that a 
fall in the number of stopped goods could have been the result of foreign producers 
sending their goods to Britain unmarked. 
 
Customs did not provide a breakdown of the total value of stopped goods under the 
Act. However, the 1890 Select Committee report did contain data on the value of 
stoppages from the United States in the financial year ending March 1889. This 
can be cross referenced with the trade returns provided in the year 1888 to provide 
 
126 Thirty Seventh Report of the Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Customs on The Customs (For the 
Year ended 31st March 1893), 1893 
127 Ibid. Seizures were 688 in 1888 and 533 in 1893. Not all goods that were detained by customs 
were seized: goods that were detained could be released if the importer in question removed 
misleading marks. 
128 For example, the testimony of James Jeffries, representing the small masters of Sheffield. 




an indication of the scale of stoppages conducted under the Act (Table 1).129 As can 
be seen, the total value of stopped goods from the United States amounted to just 
0.06% of total imports from the country. In some product categories (Books, 
Buttons, Pig Lead and Tin Ware) stoppages were a greater share of imports, but 




It is difficult to generalise stoppages of goods from the United States to other 
countries, however. The United States was not the target of the Act: this was 
Germany. Figure 1 plots the number of stoppages under the Act in the financial 
year ending March 1889 by country against the share of world trade. Germany 
makes up nearly 50% of all the stoppages performed under the Act in the first year 
of operation despite making up less than 10% of British imports.130 Belgium was 
also stopped frequently given its share of British imports (7% of stoppages versus 
4% import share) and was also complained about by manufacturers in the Select 
 
129 This comparison is a rough one because I compare trade data in the calendar year 1888 to 
customs seizures in the financial year March 1888 to March 1889 
130 Data of trade shares are taken from the Bank of England’s Millennium of Macroeconomic 
Data dataset, Thomas, R and Dimsdale, N (2017) "A Millennium of UK Data", Bank of England 
OBRA dataset, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Pages/onebank/threecenturies.aspx 
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Committee Reports.131 By contrast, the United States made up a relatively low 






131 For example, see: Special Report from the Select Committee on Merchandise Marks Act (1862) 





Partly, this is likely to be explained by the fact that stoppages under the Act were 
predominantly directed towards imports of manufactured goods, while imports 
from the United States were skewed towards primary commodities.132 Table 2 
provides data on the number of goods seized by product category in the two years 
after the Act was implemented. Final manufactured products such as stationary, 
cutlery, books, cards, glass, and woollen goods were by far the most frequently 
seized goods, reflecting the Act’s intention to reduce the importation of falsely 
marked manufactured goods. Perishable goods and food and drink products, 
 
132 Kravis, I. “The Role of Exports in Nineteenth-Century United States Growth,” Economic 
Development and Culture Change, Volume 20, Number 3, (April 1972) p.397. The fact that goods 
imported from English speaking countries with English marks were not automatically stopped 
may have also played a role in the smaller number of stoppages from the United States. 
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including cigars, wine and spirits were also stopped if less frequently, while 
primary and intermediate goods did not appear to have been stopped at all.133 
 
The Impact of the Act on British Imports: High Frequency Data from The 
Economist 
The impact of the Merchandise Marks Act on British imports of goods may have 
been larger than simply the value of those goods directly stopped at the border. 
Given the complaints by merchants about the Act causing disruption to trade, it 
could have caused trade frictions that resulted in a broader fall in British imports. 
 
Descriptive statistical evidence does not suggest that the introduction of the 
Merchandise Marks Act coincided with a decrease in British imports, however. 
The Economist provided data on the value of British imports by product category 
at a monthly frequency in its Monthly Trade Supplement.134 The advantage of this 
data is that it provides a high frequency snapshot of the impact of the Act on 
British imports for domestic consumption when it was implemented in January 
1888. I digitised monthly Economist data from December 1885 to December 1889, 
covering the two years prior to the introduction of the Merchandise Marks Act and 
two years after. The data covers eleven product categories and amounts to 576 
observations. As can be seen from Figures 2 and 3 below, it is difficult to discern a 
material short run impact of the Act on imports of manufactured articles or the 
share of manufactured imports in total imports. In fact, the growth rate of imports 
of manufactured imports increased in the two years following the introduction of 
the Merchandise Marks Act. 
 
133 It was, in fact, unclear whether the Merchandise Marks Act applied at all to primary goods. 
The Treasury convinced British customs authorities to disapply the provisions of the Act to bales 
of wool from Australia, for example. 
134 The Monthly Trade Supplement was an addendum to issues of The Economist published at a 
monthly frequency and containing detailed data on British imports and exports, as well as 





While descriptive evidence does not suggest much of an effect, I run a statistical 
model to verify this. The model uses a simple univariate time series equation to 
forecast British imports. To this, I add dummy variables to capture the 
implementation of the Merchandise Marks Act in a similar fashion to scholars 
such as Romer and Romer that have sought to determine the impact of a sudden 
policy shock on economic variables.135 The model is the following: 
 
135 Romer, C. and Romer, D. “Does Monetary Policy Matter? A New Test in the Spirit of 






Where 𝑌𝑡 is equal to the log value British imports, 𝛽1𝑇 is equal to a time trend, 
𝛽2𝐷18881889𝑡 is a dummy variable running from January 1888 to December 1889 
to capture the impact of the Merchandise Marks Act, ∑ 𝛽𝑖
11
𝑖=1 𝑀𝑖𝑡 is a series of 
monthly dummy variables designed to capture seasonality in imports. To discern 
whether the Merchandise Marks Act could have had only a short-term impact on 
trade, in a second specification of the regression I employ a dummy variable 
𝛽3𝐷1888𝑡 for the year 1888 only. I run these models across five import categories: 
total imports, manufactured goods, tobacco, duty free food and drink and raw 
materials, and also on manufactured products as a share of British imports. 
Before running the model, I conduct augmented Dickey Fuller tests to test the log 
import series for stationarity.136 Because many of the import categories appear to 
trend upward over time, I test whether each is trend stationary. The p values 
reported from these tests suggest that total imports, manufacturing imports, duty 
free food and drink imports and the share of manufacturing in total imports are 
trend stationary. By contrast, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for 
tobacco imports and raw material imports and therefore the results for these 
categories should be treated with caution. The results are presented below in table 
3.137  
 
As the descriptive evidence suggests, the Merchandise Marks Act did not appear 
to have a material effect on British trade. Coefficients on the 1888-1889 dummy 
variable are positive in the case of total imports, manufacturing imports and raw 
materials imports, although not statistically significant (the results are provided 
in Table 3(a)). Coefficients on the dummy variable are negative for the other 
categories, but again not statistically significant. If anything, these results imply 
that British manufacturing imports increased relative to their pre-1888 trend 
 
136 Woolridge, J., Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, Cengage Learning, Boston 
(2018) p.575 
137 Also presented are Durbin Watson test statistics for serial correlation. All import categories 
aside from tobacco do not display serial correlation of error terms. 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑇 +  𝛽2𝐷18881889𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
11
𝑖=1 𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  u𝑡 
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after the Act was implemented.138 Interestingly, however, the coefficients on 
dummy variable only running in 1888 are negative and statistically significant for 
manufacturing, tobacco, and raw material imports (Table 3(b)). This would be 
consistent with the hypothesis that the Merchandise Marks Act had an initially 
negative short run impact on British imports which subsequently reversed as 
exporters adjusted to the new regime.139  
 
138 A potential confounding factor is the business cycle. Recent estimates of British GDP provided 
by Solomou and Thomas show growth accelerating in the last two years of the 1880s, which could 
explain the increase in British manufacturing imports. The business cycle is controlled for in the 
next set of regressions in the section below. Solomou, S. & Thomas, R. “Feinstein Fulfilled: 
Updated Estimates of UK GDP 1841-1920,” ESCoE Technical Report 04, (August 2019), p.35 
139 As monthly dummies removed 11 degrees of freedom for the regression, the model was re-









The Impact of the Act on British Imports: Board of Trade Data  
While the model above suggests that the Merchandise Marks Act had at most only 
a short run negative impact on British imports, to conclude it had little impact on 
British trade would be naïve. First, aggregate import data like that above does not 
capture the fact the Act was focused on imports from certain countries such as 
Germany. Second, the model above does not take account of other factors that 
could have influenced British imports at the time, such as the state of the global 
business cycle or relative trade costs.  
 
To assess the impact of the Merchandise Marks Act on British imports while 
taking account of these factors, I focus on British imports from Germany and 
Belgium. As I have already discussed, Germany was the primary target of the Act, 
while Belgium also saw a substantial proportion of its exports stopped relative to 
its share of British trade. If the Act had any effect on British imports, it should 
show up in imports from these two countries.  
 
Data on total British imports from Germany and as a share of world imports is 
presented in figure 4.140 They do not appear to show a clear impact on British 
imports after its introduction, although the German share did fall somewhat in 
the years 1888-1891.  
 
 
140 Germany’s share of UK imports is calculated from the Board of Trade Annual Statement of 
British Trade with Foreign Countries and Colonial Possessions from the years 1879, 1882, 1887, 





To formally test whether British imports from Germany and Belgium were 
affected by the Act it is necessary to turn to trade theory. There is a substantial 
literature on modelling bilateral trade flows. A common approach is to model 
imports as a function of the importing country’s demand, the exporting country’s 
supply, and the relative costs of trade.141 Pinning down the relative costs of trade, 
not just in terms of the trade costs between partners, but these bilateral trade 
costs relative to the trade costs each partner faces against the rest of the world – 
known as multilateral resistance terms – has proved a challenge in empirical 
studies.142 One approach is to account for these costs using country fixed effects in 
a panel data setting.143 Country fixed effects capture time invariant trade costs 
between trading partners such as distance, land borders and language as well as 
other unobserved characteristics. In a panel setting, time fixed effects can also be 
 
141 Bacchetta, M., Beverelli, C., Cadot, O., Fugazza, M. Grether, J-M., Helble, M., Nicita, A. and 
Piermartini, R, A Practical Guide to Trade Policy Analysis, UN/World Trade Organization, (New 
York, 2012), p.104 
142 Miao, Z., Wu, X. and Yu, Jinping, “Direct and Relative Effects of the Import Tariff: Estimation 
Using the Chinese Industrial Level Data,” MPRA Paper No.88056, (July, 2018), p.3 
143 Yotov, Y, Piermartini, R, Montiero, J-A., and Larch, M., An Advanced Guide to Trade Policy 
Analysis: The Structural Gravity Model, UN/World Trade Organization, (New York, 2019), p.19  
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deployed to take account of time varying characteristics that affect all trading 
partners, such as the state of the global business cycle. 
 
As I am focusing on whether British imports from two countries – Germany and 
Belgium – were impacted by a policy change – the Merchandise Marks Act – over 
time, this approach is appealing. By using a panel of British imports by country, I 
can account for multilateral resistance using country fixed effects, and factors such 
as the global or British business cycle, using time fixed effects. Time varying 
bilateral trade costs that vary by country are captured by relative export prices.  
I compile data on British imports by major trading partner from 1875-1900, the 
export prices of British trading partners, and a measure of the economic openness 
of British trading partners. This economic openness variable is designed to capture 
other time and country varying characteristics in exporters that originate from the 
supply side, such as shifts in economic composition in favour of the export 
industry.144  
 
British imports by country are collected from the Board of Trade’s Annual 
Statement of British Trade with Foreign Countries and Colonial Possessions 
which I digitized by hand.145 For export prices, I calculated implied export price 
indices from the Federico-Tena World Trade Historical Database.146 Economic 
openness is also collected from the Federico Tena database and is defined as the 
ratio of total exports to GDP.147  
 
The model I run is: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑖𝑡 +𝛽3𝐷𝑀𝑖𝑡 + α𝑖 + б𝑡 + u𝑖𝑡 
 
144 Due to Britain’s support of free trade, no tariffs were introduced on imports during the period 
in question (except for the policy intervention of interest – the Merchandise Marks Act) and 
therefore tariffs do not need to be accounted for in the model. 
145 I collected data on British imports from 11 countries – the United States, Belgium, France, 
Australia, Germany, China, Russia, Holland, Egypt, Canada and India representing 75% total 
British imports 
146 Implied export prices were calculated as the ratio of current to constant prices at 1913 
borders. Federico, G. and Tena-Junguito A. “World trade, 1800-1938: a new synthesis,” Revista de 
Historia Económica-Journal of Iberian and Latin America Economic History, Volume 37, Issue.1, 




Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the log value of British imports from exporter i and time t, 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is export 
prices of exporter i at time t, 𝑂𝑖𝑡 is the economic openness of exporter i at time t,  
𝛽3𝐷𝑀𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable that switches on for Germany and Belgium from 1888-
1893, in other words for the five years after the Merchandise Marks Act was 
implemented. Finally, α𝑖   and б𝑡 capture time fixed effects and country fixed effects 
respectively.148 
 
Applied to aggregate British imports by country, the above model should capture 
the effect of the Merchandise Marks Act on imports from Germany. As I have 
argued above, however, the treatment intensity of the Act differed when it came 
to categories of imports, with manufactured goods frequently stopped by British 
customs, perishable food and drink also stopped if less frequently, while primary 
commodities such as metals or coal were not stopped. To take account of this 
difference in treatment intensity, I zero in on specific product categories that the 
customs data suggest were frequently stopped. The Board of Trade provided a 
detailed breakdown of British imports by country and commodity, which has been 
used by scholars such as Chadha et al to provide evidence on the impact of tariffs 
on British trade.149 An advantage of using a commodity by commodity approach is 
that goods are closer substitutes for one another. This can overcome aggregation 
bias and provide a more precise estimate of the impact of a policy change on 
trade.150  
 
I therefore run the same panel model as above on six different product categories 
that correspond to goods that were frequently stopped by customs in Table 2 – 
China and Earthenware, Books, Glass Manufactures, Wine, Toys and Woollen 
Manufactures. Again, I digitize the data by hand from the original trade returns. 
 
148 An alternative specification of the regression would be to use GDP rather than economic 
openness to control for time varying supply side factors from exporters. As a robustness check, I 
therefore replaced openness with GDP. This did not change the conclusions of the regressions. 
149 Chadha, J., Lennard, J., Solomou, S., and Thomas, R. “Exchange Rates, Tariffs and Prices in 
1930s’ Britain” in Keynes’s Economic Consequences of the Peace, eds. Clavin, P., Corsetti, G., 
Obstfeld, M., and Tooze, A. (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming) 
150 McDaniel, C. and Balistieri, E. “A Discussion on Armington Trade Substitution Elasticities,” 
US International Trade Commission Office of Economics Working Paper, No. 2002-01-A 
(December 2001), p.4 
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The motivation for choosing these categories over other goods that were also 
frequently stopped is due to data availability. For example, the product category 
Cutlery was not enumerated in the trade returns for Germany. Another important 
factor was the availability of both volume and value data for imports. The trade 
returns do not enumerate both volume and value data for each product category. 
This makes it impossible to construct price series for all commodities, which I do 
by simply dividing the value of imports by the volume, thus deriving unit values.151 
A key difference in the commodity level regressions versus the aggregate level is 
therefore that the dependent variable refers to the volume of imports, rather than 
the value. This is another important advantage as volumes are conventionally 
used in estimating trade regressions. I include two categories, Toys and Woollen 
Manufactures, even though volume data was not available. This is because these 
two categories were frequently stopped and I thought it desirable to test for an 
effect, with the proviso of being unable to control for prices. 
 
The sample of countries in each panel regression differs (with the exception of 
Germany’s inclusion), reflecting the availability of commodity level data by 
country in the Board of Trade returns. In each regression I have endeavoured to 
include as representative a sample of British imports as possible. My sample 
coverage for aggregate level British imports is 75% over the sample period. For 
earthenware and porcelain, for example, it is 93%. A fuller discussion of the data 
is provided in the appendix. 
 
The results of the regressions are presented in table 4.152 Reassuringly, the 
coefficient on prices is correctly signed for aggregate imports and correctly signed 
for all but one category (books) at the commodity level, with the coefficients 
generally larger at the commodity level, as should be expected. For imports of 
glass, prices are statistically significant. The coefficient on the economic openness 
of exporters is also correctly signed at the aggregate level, and statistically 
 
151 In line with Chadha et al (forthcoming) 
152 Robust standard errors were used for regressions at both the aggregate and the commodity 
level. This is because the error terms displayed serial correlation. 
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significant at the product level for books.153 The dummy variable capturing the 
effect of the Merchandise Marks Act on German imports is positively signed at the 
aggregate level and for all but one commodity (glass manufactures) and in the case 
of wine, statistically significant. This suggests that, if anything, British imports 
from Germany and Belgium increased after 1888, when controlling for other 
factors. This lends support to the view of contemporaries that the Act may have 
backfired by providing German imports free advertising. 
 
153 The coefficients for prices and economic openness were statistically significant using normal 






Impact of the Act on the Transhipment Trade: Evidence from India  
Merchants and shippers complained that the Merchandise Marks Act had a 
negative impact on their industries, by re-routing the entrepot trade away from 
Britain and encouraging direct German trade links with foreign markets.  
 
To test this final claim, I focus on trade with India. India was by some distance 
the largest colonial market, and the single largest export market, for Britain over 
the period, making up just over 13% of total British exports in 1890 as compared 
to 12.2% for the United States, Britain’s next largest export partner.154 Complaints 
from British merchants also singled out India as a location that the Act had 
diverted the British transhipment trade away from. They claimed the country had 
seen direct trading links with foreign countries develop as a result of the Act. 
Indeed, the Colonial Government notes this directly in 1890.155 Fortuitously, from 
1867 the Colonial Administration in Calcutta presented detailed statistics on 
Indian trade with Britain and other markets contained in the Annual Statement 
of the Trade and Navigation of British India with Foreign Countries. These 
provided data on Indian exports by product and was the most detailed set of trade 
statistics compiled for any British colonial market.156 
 
Descriptive evidence supports the claims of merchants and shippers. Figure 5 
shows the change in Indian import share by country in the three years preceding 
the Merchandise Marks Act and the three years after its implementation. Britain’s 
market share of Indian imports declined significantly (-2.15%), while the countries 
that were most affected by the Act, based on the number of stoppages by British 
customs above, all saw their share of Indian imports increase, most notably 
Germany (0.98%) and Belgium (0.69%). 
 
 
154 Varian, B. “The Course and Character of Late Victorian Exports,” LSE e-thesis, (2017) p.27 
155 Statement of the Trade of British India with British Possessions and Foreign Countries For the 
Five Years 1890-91 to 1894-5, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1895, London, p.14 
156 See: Sugihara, K. “Notes on the Trade Statistics of British India,” Osaka University, last 





This change is even more pronounced when comparing a time series of Germany 
and Britain’s share of Indian imports. As figure 6 shows, the share of Indian 
imports from Germany increased rapidly in the years after 1888, from less than 
0.31% in that year to 2.5% in the year 1890. In value terms, the increase was in 
the region of an order of magnitude: from 1,944,930 rupees in 1887 to 16,916,490 
rupees in 1890. At the same time, British export share to India declined from 79% 





While this provides strong graphical evidence the Merchandise Marks Act may 
have negatively impacted British trade with India in favour of Germany, it is 
again necessary to control for variables that could have impacted the relative 
share of Indian imports. The increasing integration of global markets and fall in 
trade costs could have allowed foreign exporters such as Germany to make inroads 
into Indian trade.157 British exports also became less competitive over this 
period.158 
 
I take a similar panel approach to the one when I investigated the possible impact 
of the Act on British imports from Germany. Again, I digitize data on Indian 
imports by major trading partner between 1875-1900, collect export prices and a 
measure of economic openness. And, as before, I am particularly interested in 
products that appear to have been intensively affected by the Merchandise Marks 
Act. The granularity of the Indian trade returns allows me to conduct a similar 
 
157 Jacks, D. “What drove 19th century commodity market integration?” Explorations in Economic 
History, 43 (2006), p.405 
158 Aldcroft, D. “The Entrepreneur and the British Economy, 1870-1914,” The Economic History 
Review, Vol 17, No. 1, (1964), p.113 
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exercise to that done for Britain. A further advantage is that, like Britain, India 
pursued a policy of free trade in the late nineteenth century, meaning that the 
effects of tariffs do not need to be accounted for in the analysis of Indian imports.159 
 
At this point, it is worth highlighting graphical evidence that suggests the 
Merchandise Marks Act was extremely impactful on Indian imports in the 
categories that were most stopped by British customs. Most striking of all are the 
rapid rises in manufactured goods imports from Germany after 1887. Imports of 
apparel, for example, increased from a negligible amount before 1888 to close to 
10% of the British market share. A similar pattern is shown by imports of cutlery 




159 Rothermand, D. An economic history of India: from pre-colonial times to 1991, Routledge, 





One distinction between these regressions and those above for British imports 
from Germany is that I also include a dummy variable for Britain that switches 
on after 1888 to capture the potentially negative effect of trade diversion to 
Germany on British exports. As before, at the aggregate level, the dependent 
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variable is the value of British imports while at the commodity level it is the 
volume.160 
 
When it comes to regressions at the commodity level, my sample period is the year 
1880 to 1895. Again, the reason for this sample period is due to data limitations. 
Before the year 1880, data on trade between Germany and India by product 
category is scarce. The graduality of product categories enumerated in the trade 
returns also deteriorates after 1895. 
 
The results are presented in table 5. As before, coefficients on relative prices are 
correctly signed, and statistically significant at the product level for spirits. The 
coefficient on openness is also correctly signed.161 The dummy variable that 
switches on for Germany and Belgium is positive and statistically significant at 
the aggregate level and product level for Indian imports of wine, spirits, toys and 
cutlery suggesting that the Merchandise Marks Act had a positive impact on 
German exports to India. The dummy variable that switches on for Britain after 
1888 is positive but very small and statistically insignificant at the aggregate 
level, but negative at a commodity level and statistically significant for imports of 
woollen manufactures  suggesting, as per the descriptive evidence, that British 
trade may have been negatively impacted by the Act.  
 
160 As with the regressions on British imports, I include two categories (toys and cutlery) where 
volume data is not available but where it is desirable to test for an effect given these categories 
were frequently stopped. 
161 Again, robust standard errors are included at an aggregate and commodity level to take 






Robustness Checks and Discussion 
In this section I undertake robustness checks on the models. One consideration 
was whether the effect of the Merchandise Marks Act could have been better 
identified using a difference in difference strategy. While I experimented with this 
methodology, and initial results were promising, I ultimately decided against this 
approach. First, there is little precedent in using a difference in difference strategy 
to assess the effects of a policy change on trade.162 While Lloyd and Solomou adopt 
difference in difference to assess the effect of the 1932 General Tariff on industries, 
they examined productivity and output growth, not trade flows.163 Second, an 
important identifying assumption of a difference in difference approach is that the 
counterfactual trend of ‘control’ and ‘treatment’ groups would have been similar 
absent a policy change.164 In the case of late nineteenth century trade, this 
assumption does not hold. Germany and Belgium, as among the few 
industrialising nations of the time, would have been expected to make inroads into 
Indian imports in the absence of the Merchandise Marks Act relative to other trade 
partners, as I discuss in more detail below. 
 
A second consideration is whether to use random effects or fixed effects in the 
panel model. Random effects are more appropriate if the unobserved time 
invariant characteristics are not correlated with the other independent 
variables.165 I use fixed effects for each panel regression because there is strong 
reason to believe they are more appropriate from a theoretical perspective. 
Unobserved time invariant characteristics that are controlled for by fixed effects 
may well be correlated to the independent variables. For example, geographical 
 
162 For example, difference in difference is not included among the estimation techniques outlined 
in Yotov, Y, Piermartini, R, Montiero, J-A., and Larch, M., An Advanced Guide to Trade Policy 
Analysis: The Structural Gravity Model, UN/World Trade Organization, New York (2019), p.19  
163 Lloyd, S. & Solomou, S. “The impact of the 1932 General Tariff: a difference in difference 
approach,” Cliometrica, 14, (2020) 
164 Angrist, J. & Pischke, J-S, Mostly Harmless Econometrics, Princeton University Press, 
(Princeton, 2009), p.230 




size could be correlated to prices. The use of fixed effects is in line with other 
authors that have sought to model bilateral trade flows in a panel data setting.166 
 
A third consideration is the fact that the import values and volumes I use as 
dependent variables are not stationary. Woolridge notes that with non-stationary 
data, where the t is relatively large in panel data, the spurious regression problem 
can arise.167 I therefore run a regression in first differences at the aggregate level 
for imports from India and Britain as a robustness check in the manner of Baier 
and Bergstrand.168 Again, these regressions do not show the Merchandise Marks 
Act had a negative impact on British imports from Germany and Belgium but do 
show a statistically significant increase in Indian imports from Germany and 
Belgium.169  
 
As the dependent variable is expressed as a logarithm, the coefficients on the 
dummy variables above can be transformed to interpret them as the percentage 
increase or decrease in trade caused by the introduction of the Merchandise Marks 
Act. The results indicate that the impact of the Act caused a 500% increase in 
German exports to India.170 The magnitude seems very large, but in some respects 
is intuitive as German and Belgian exports to India before the Act was passed 
were negligible, before exploding higher. One might attribute the size of the effect 
to the establishment of commercial ties which lifted trade in a non-linear fashion.  
 
Nevertheless, it is worth considering whether omitted variables could be 
responsible for the surge in Indian imports from Germany. One complaint from 
shippers was subsidies provided by foreign commercial rivals to their shipping 
lines.171 Data on German ships entering into Indian ports is provided by the Indian 
 
166 Baier, S. and Bergstrand J. “Do free trade agreements actually increase members’ 
international trade?’ Journal of International Economics, 71, (2007) p.84 
167 Woolridge, J., Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, Cengage Learning, Boston 
(2018) p.440 
168 Baier, S. and Bergstrand J. “Do free trade agreements actually increase members’ 
international trade?’ Journal of International Economics, Volume 71, Issue 1, (2007) p.86 
169 These results are reported in the appendix 
170 A 95% confidence interval of the effect on German and Belgium exports is 68% to 2045% 




trade data. The total tonnage of German vessels entering at Indian ports increased 
from 0.2% of the total in 1888 to above 4% in 1894.172 It is therefore possible that 
subsidies to German lines were the primary driver of the increase in German trade 
with India rather than trade diversion effects.  
 
German preferential treatment for its shipping industry dates back to 1879 with 
Chancellor Bismarck exempting the shipbuilding industry from tariffs. Significant 
financial support to German shipping began in April 1885, intended for steamers 
sailing to Australia and East Asia.173 These timings do not fit with the argument 
that shipping subsidies was the cause of German exports surging after 1887. 
Nevertheless, in 1890 the German government did provide a subsidy to the Oest-
Afrika Line from Hamburg to the ports of East Africa. This line stopped off at 
Bombay. To control for this possibility, I include another dummy variable that 
switches on for Germany after 1891 when the Deutsche Ost-Afrika line began its 
operations. The results show that while the coefficient from the Merchandise 
Marks Act dummy declines somewhat, it continues to have an upward effect on 
German exports that is both large and statistically significant.174  
 
Did German exports to India increase because of the diminishment of the British 
trans-shipment trade and the establishment of direct commercial relations 
between Germany and India, as contemporary accounts suggest? These claims 
chime with descriptive evidence which shows the share of German exports to be 
transhipped through Britain.175 As figure 10 shows, these declined noticeably after 
the year 1887, falling from 16% to 6% by 1895, before gradually recovering. It is 
thus possible that after establishing direct commercial ties with British colonies, 
German exports increased still further as colonial consumers became acquainted 
with the quality of German products. 
 
172 Calculated from Annual Statement of the Trade and Navigation of British India with Foreign 
Countries 1890 and 1895  
173 Meeker, R. “History of Shipping Subsidies,” Publications of the American Economic 
Association, Third Series, Volume 6, Number 3, (August 1905), p.85 
174 The estimated effect on trade declines to a 429% increase. The regression results are 
presented in the Appendix 
175 Data are taken from the Board of Trade’s Annual Statement of the Trade of the United 





While it seems the primary channel of trade diversion was through the 
transhipment trade, it is important to stress that the Act itself was likely 
endogenous. It was motivated in part by the increasing encroachment of German 
exports on British industry. Meanwhile, the growth of the German export industry 
in Asia was being encouraged independently of the passing of the Merchandise 
Marks Act.176 The estimates of the effect of the Act on trade is thus likely to be 
upwardly biased. Despite this, contemporary sources and later scholarship have 
argued that an important pillar of German success in world markets during the 
latter half of the nineteenth century was superior commercial prowess including 
marketing, trade finance and customer service.177 As such, by providing a 
sufficient incentive for foreign exporters to overcome initial fixed costs in 
establishing commercial ties with British colonial markets, the Act was likely to 
have accelerated the trend.178 It is also worth considering a counter-factual in 
 
176 Hoffman, R., Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry, 1875-1914 (Routledge, New York, 
2021) p.201, Pflanze, O. Bismarck and the Development of Germany, Volume III: The Period of 
Fortification 1880-1898, Princeton University Press, (Princeton, 2014) p.123 
177 Brown, J.C. “Imperfect Competition and Anglo-German Trade Rivalry: Markets for Cotton 
Textiles before 1914, The Journal of Economic History, Vol.55 No.3 (September 1995), p.510 
178 Supporting this line of argument, Jacks and Pendakur see transport links and the fall in 
maritime shipping costs in the late 19th century as endogenous to demand and growing incomes, 
Jacks, D. and Pendakur, K. “Global Trade and the Maritime Transport Revolution,” NBER 
Working Paper 14139, (June 2008), p.22  
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which if the transhipment trade had been exempted from the Act, as shippers and 
merchants desired, the British transport industry could have benefitted from the 
increased volume of foreign exports shipped to colonial markets. Transhipped 
exports fell from an average of 5.3% of total British exports in the twelve years 
before the Act to 4.4% in the twelve years after, a disappointing performance given 





This dissertation is the first detailed study of one of the most important pieces of 
British trade legislation in the late nineteenth century. Motivated by the 
industrial depression of that began in the 1870s, advancing foreign trade 
competition and greater awareness of the value of brands in an increasingly 
globalised market place, the 1887 Merchandise Marks Act was an early form of 
geographical indication legislation. While the economic literature is still 
ambiguous about whether GIs represent an aid to market efficiency or a barrier 
to trade, I show from primary sources that the Act was partly inspired by a desire 
to protect the British manufacturing industry. It was supported by economic 
interest groups that stood to benefit from brand protection (manufacturers) and 
opposed by those that stood to lose from an obstacle to open trading arrangements 
(merchants and shippers). It was passed the same year that controversy over free 
trade reached its zenith in late Victorian Britain. I find no evidence that it 
diminished foreign manufacturing imports into Britain, but strong evidence that 
it resulted in a diversion of Britain’s entrepot trade, to the disadvantage of the 
shipping industry, and benefit of foreign commercial rivals. 
 
 
179 Calculated from Board of Trade Annual Statement of British Trade with Foreign Countries 
and Colonial Possessions from the years 1879, 1882, 1887, 1891, 1896 and 1900. Britain’s share 
of world exports fell from 20.6% in 1888 to 17.8% in 1890. Thomas, R and Dimsdale, N (2017) "A 




What does this study contribute to the three debates raised in the introduction? 
This dissertation suggests the political economy of British trade policy during the 
period was more complex than the framework described by Williamson: namely 
that because of the relatively small share of Britain’s agricultural sector, 
manufacturing interests won out against agrarian ones, ensuring that Britain 
continued to stick to free trade. Instead, the Merchandise Marks Act is an example 
of manufacturers lobbying successfully against foreign, principally German, trade 
competition. This fits with literature that stresses monopolistic competition 
models of late nineteenth century trade above those of comparative advantage. 
The Merchandise Marks Act nevertheless achieved broad based political support 
in Parliament, including from free traders. In part, this is due to the fact that 
manufacturing interests were aligned behind the legislation (while agrarian 
interests featured little). The fact that the Act was conceived as a barrier to ‘unfair’ 
foreign competition, rather than a tariff, allowed it to evade ideological suspicion 
as a form of protectionism, at least initially, in the same way that Liberal free 
traders became willing to support government interventions in trade through 
state regulation, but not tariffs, in the early 1900s.180 Cornelius Torp has 
emphasised fragmented support for free trade within sectors of the German 
economy in the late nineteenth century, with agrarian interests aligned with 
manufacturing ones in industries that either suffered from global competition 
such as the cloth industry, or were able to form effective cartels, even as other 
sectors such as electronics and dyes benefitted from free access to global 
markets.181 In Britain, the interests of the manufacturing community intersected 
with those of fair traders when it came to the Merchandise Marks Act, illustrated 
by the unlikely political pairing of the Liberal MP Mundella and Conservative fair 
trader MP Vincent as its primary advocates. The 1887 Merchandise Marks Act 
might thus be seen as part of a globalisation backlash that crystallised in the late 
 
180 Howe provides the example of the Liberals’ Merchant Shipping Act 1903. Howe, A. Free Trade 
and Liberal England, Oxford University Press, (Oxford, 1998), p.238 
181 C. Torp, “Imperial Germany Under Globalisation,” in Müller, S-O., and Torp, C. Imperial 




1880s and early 1890s with a variety of tariffs being introduced by foreign nations 
in quick succession.182 
 
When it comes to whether free trade policy benefitted the British economy, this 
dissertation provides support for Broadberry and Craft’s argument that any 
benefits accruing to British manufacturing through the hypothetical adoption of 
tariffs should be counter-balanced with the costs on Britain’s high productivity 
services sector. It should not be forgotten that Britain’s mercantile and shipping 
industries represented a significant asset for Britain in the late Victorian period. 
In 1907, Britain’s transport, storage and communication sector represented 10% 
of GVA.183 The transport and communication sector represented 4.6% of 
employment in 1870.184 Had Britain exempted the transhipment trade from the 
provisions of the Act, as requested by the shipping and mercantile industries, 
Britain could have profited from the ongoing expansion of foreign exports through 
the provision of commercial and shipping services. Instead, policymakers 
prioritised the interests of manufacturers. Ex post evidence suggests this was 
misguided. Ex ante, it is also questionable whether such a trade-off was justified. 
Britain had a huge comparative advantage in shipping. The record of some of the 
industries the Act sought to protect from German competition is more mixed, 
according to revealed comparative advantage indicators drawn up by Varian. 
While Britain enjoyed a comparative advantage in sectors such as steel 
manufacturers and woollen textiles, other industries such as glass, paper 
manufactures, and spirits were uncompetitive on global markets.185 
 
 
182 Varian, B. “British Exports and Foreign Tariffs during the Internationalization of 
Industrialisation,” Forthcoming, p.27 
183 Feinstein, C H (1972), National income, output and expenditure of the United Kingdom 1855-
1965, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in Thomas, R and Dimsdale, N (2017) "A 
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Finally, when considering the impact of trade policy on trade, this dissertation 
suggests that non-tariff barriers such as the Merchandise Marks Act could result 
in significant effects on trade. The large increase in German exports to India as a 
result of the trade diversion caused by the Act suggests that trade policy, outside 
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This dissertation takes data from four main sources.  
 
The number of goods stopped (detained) from the United States and the value of 
detentions (Table 1) are taken from Report from the Select Committee on 
Merchandise Marks Act, 1887, Henry Hansard, July 1890, Appendix No. 6, p.313. 
The number of stoppages by country (Figure 1) are taken from the same source, 
Appendix No. 10, p.320. The most seized goods (Table 2) are taken from the same 
source, Appendix No. 7, pp.314-315. The Select Committee Report can be 
downloaded from ProQuest UK Parliamentary Papers: U.K. Parliamentary 
Papers document (proquest.com) 
 
High frequency data on British imports by month are taken from The Economist. 
The Economist ‘Monthly Trade Supplement’ provided data on British imports by 
broad product category. The issues were from December 1885 to December 1889. 
In total I collected 576 observations for 12 different product categories (living 
animals, food and drink (duty free), food and drink (dutiable), tobacco, metals, 
chemicals and dyes, oils, raw materials (for textiles), raw materials (other), 
manufactures, miscellaneous, total). The Monthly Trade Supplement was missing 
for the months January 1887 to June 1887 in the online archive. However, as the 
Trade Supplemented provided the change in imports from the same month in the 
preceding year, it was possible to backfill these dates. The data can be downloaded 
from The Economist Historical Archive provided by Gale. Entire Document (trade 
supplement) LIMITS: Publication Year (1888) - Results - The Economist Historical 
Archive (lse.ac.uk) 
 
British imports by year, product and country were taken from the Annual 
Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom with Foreign Countries and British 
Possessions for the years 1879, 1882, 1887, 1891, 1896 and 1900. The data can be 
downloaded from ProQuest UK Parliamentary Papers. U.K. Parliamentary 
Papers document (proquest.com) 
 
Indian imports by year, product and country were taken from the Statement of the 
Trade of British India with British Possessions and Foreign Countries for the 
years 1875/6-1879/80, 1880/1-1884/5, 1885/6-1889/90, 1890/1-1894/5, 1896/7-
1900/1901. The data can be downloaded from ProQuest UK Parliamentary Papers: 
U.K. Parliamentary Papers document (proquest.com) 
 
Trade Database 
Data on aggregate British imports and aggregate Indian imports by country were 
provided in the Annual Statement and the Statement of the Trade of British India. 
For example, for the years 1878-1882 this can be found on page 2 in the 1882 





In selecting the data for the commodity level regressions, three considerations 
were at play. First, it was necessary that the commodities were likely to be affected 
by the Act, so trade categories were first cross referenced with data on product 
stoppages from Table 2.  
 
Second, it was necessary to ensure consistency of country categories across time. 
For example, the trade returns enumerate Norwegian exports of glass 
manufactures after 1892 but not beforehand, meaning Norway is excluded from 
the panel on British imports of glass manufactures. In the case of British imports 
of books, data is not available before 1883 for Holland and the United States, but 
these countries are included thereafter. Because the countries enumerated in the 
trade returns for each individual product category differed, the sample of countries 
in each panel regression also differed. A list of which countries were included in 
each regression is provided in Table 6.  
 
Third, it was necessary to ensure consistency across products. Product categories 
were subject to change. Imports of Glass Manufactures were a distinct but 
subcategory of imports of Glass, for example. The category Spirits, when it came 
to data on Indian imports, was enumerated at the product level category for 
Germany and Britain pre 1890 but at an individual level category (Brandy, Gin 
etc) thereafter, meaning that values were summed to ensure a consistent product 
category over time. In the case of the Indian trade data, exchange rate units were 
changed in the years 1899 and 1900 making it necessary to convert data provided 
in sterling for the years 1899 and 1900 using prevailing exchange rates.  
 
Fourth, and finally, it was desirable to ensure that both value and volume data 
existed for each product category. In two cases for British imports, I deviated from 
this for the British regressions (Toys and Woollen Manufactures) and in two 
categories for Indian imports (Toys and Cutlery) as I thought it desirable to check 
these categories that were frequently stopped, even accounting for the inability to 










At the aggregate level, export prices were taken from the Federico-Tena World 
Trade Historical Database. Export price indices were calculated as the ratio of 
exports at current prices 1913 borders to exports at constant prices 1913 borders. 
At the commodity level, export prices were calculated as the value of imports in 
sterling terms, or in the Indian trade data, 10s of rupees, to the volume of exports 
in unit terms.  
 
Data on economic openness (defined as exports/GDP) was taken from the Federico-
Tena World Trade Historical Database. For the countries China, Russia, 
Gibraltar, the Straights Settlements and Austria economic openness was not 
available from the database for these dates, leaving the panel regressions 
including these countries unbalanced. Excluding these countries from the 
regressions did not substantively change the results.  
 
Econometric robustness checks 
Dickey Fuller statistics for Indian imports at an aggregate level are presented in 
table 7 below. These show that log level imports are non-stationary for all of the 
countries in the sample. However, log first differences are stationary. The same 
issue of non-stationarity also arises in British imports. As a robustness check 
against the possibility of spurious regression results, I perform a regression in log 
differences at the aggregate level for both British and Indian imports. This shows 
(Table 8) that the Merchandise Marks Act dummy continues to exert a statistically 
significant positive effect on Indian imports from Germany and Belgium in the 
three years after 1887 but has no impact on British imports from Germany or 
Belgium. 
 
As a final robustness check, I re-run the aggregate level imports including a 
dummy variable for 1891 to capture the possibility that the opening of the German 
Oest-Afrika line that stopped at Bombay line was principally responsible for the 
increase in Indian imports from Germany over the period. The result of this 
regression is provided in Table 9 and does not suggest this was the case. It shows 
that while the post 1891 dummy for Germany (German shipping) has a positive 
sign, it is not statistically significant, while size of the post 1887 dummy for 
Belgium and Germany decreases only slightly and remains statistically 
significant.   
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